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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Richard F. Norris, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Utah Court of Appeala 
SEP 2 6 2002 
Paulette Stagg 
Cferk of the Court 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20000202-CA 
F I L E D 
(September 26, 2002) 
2002 UT App 305 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Robiil W. Reese 
Attorneys: Sharon L. Preston, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Jackson, Davis, and Orme. 
JACKSON, Presiding Judge: 
%1 Richard Norris appeals his sentence entered pursuant to 
conditional pleas of guilty to two counts of communications 
fraud, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-1801(1) (1995) . 
BACKGROUND 
^2 Norris advertised employment positions, promising salaries 
and benefits for "diet counselors." Norris required the 
prospective "employees" to sign what they believed to be 
agreements regarding the custody of the diet product. Those 
agreements were in fact sales agreements wherein the "employees" 
turned out to be purchasers of the product, rather than employees 
entrusted with distributing the product. When the "employees" 
refused to pay, Norris then sued on those contracts. He was 
eventually charged with thirteen counts of communications fraud. 
1)3 Norris1 s trial counsel assured him that the trial date would 
be continued. However, on the date set for trial, the trial 
court denied Norris's motion to continue. Norris's counsel then 
urged him to plead guilty to two of the charges, rather than face 
conviction for all thirteen charges, pursuant to a plea bargain 
agreement offered by the prosecution before trial. Norris 
followed his attorney's advice, and pleaded guilty pursuant to 
State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (allowing entry 
of guilty plea conditioned upon Defendant's preservation of right 
to appeal trial court's denial of suppression motion). He 
conditioned his pleas upon assurances by the court and the 
prosecution that certain issues would be preserved for appeal. 
The court specifically enumerated the issues that Norris would 
have the right to appeal once his guilty pleas were accepted and 
entered.1 That enumerated list included his claim of vindictive 
prosecution.2 The record indicates that'Norris raised this issue 
several times through the course of the proceedings. Although 
the court had not ruled on Norris's vindictive prosecution claim, 
it promised him that he had a right to appeal it. In fact, the 
court stated "I would like to make a list of those motions that 
1. The court itemized the following issues as preserved for 
appeal: (1) the court's denial of Norris's motion to dismiss 
based on the statute of limitations; (2) the court's denial of 
Norris's motion to dismiss based on the expungement of the arrest 
records made in conjunction with the charges; (3) the court's 
denial of Norris's motion to remove his counsel for incompetency 
and conflict of interest; (4) the effective denial of Norris's 
speedy trial rights; (5) Norris's vindictive prosecution claim; 
(6) the State's failure to comply with discovery requests; (7) 
the constitutionality of Utah's communications fraud statute; and 
(8) inadequacy of the information. 
2. After the court enumerated the appealable issues, Norris 
struggled to identify more issues he hoped to preserve. The 
court apparently satisfied Norris's trepidation by promising 
Norris that "you're reserving the right to appeal any issue that 
the Court has heard and ruled on, but ruled adversely to you 
. . . you'd have a right to appeal that issue." The parties 
agreed in oral arguments that this was the most sweeping Serv 
plea they had seen. Although the breadth of the court's promises 
is not an issue before us, we note our concern that blanket 
preservation of issues for appeal may very well overflow the 
banks of what is allowable under Sery and its progeny. See State 
v. Serv, 758 P. 2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In Sery, we adopted 
the practice of accepting conditional guilty pleas because 
"forcing the parties to go through an entire trial merely to 
preserve the suppression issue is a pointless and wasteful 
exercise." Sery, 758 P.2d at 93 9. Thus, conditional pleas serve 
the purpose of promoting judicial economy. The broad conditional 
pleas involved here, however, do not serve the ends of judicial 
economy. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Richard Norris, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20020966-CA 
F I L E D 
(August 12, 2004) 
2004 UT App 267 
Fourth District, Provo Department 
The Honorable James R. Taylor 
Attorneys: Jennifer K. Gowans, Provo, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Orme. 
DAVIS, Judge: 
11 After entering an unconditional, voluntary guilty plea to three 
counts of communications fraud, Richard Norris (Defendant) challenges 
the constitutionality of the underlying statute (the communications 
fraud statute) on appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (2003).-^-
We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
52 Defendant was charged with seven counts of communications fraud 
and was bound over on all counts. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 
(2003). After several days of trial, Defendant entered an 
unconditional, voluntary guilty plea to three counts of third-degree-
felony communications fraud. See id. § 76-10-1801(1)(c). After 
sentencing, and without moving to withdraw his guilty pleas, 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, mounting a facial 
challenge to the constitutionality of the communications fraud 
statute on overbreadth and vagueness grounds. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
13 We consider two issues on appeal. First, we must determine whether 
this court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider Defendant's 
constitutional challenge after Defendant entered an unconditional, 
voluntary guilty plea. "The determination of whether a court has 
subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review for 
correctness . . . ." Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81,18, 31 
P.3d 1147. Second, if this court has jurisdiction, then we must 
consider whether the communications fraud statute is 
unconstitutionally overbroad or vague on its face. "Constitutional 
challenges to statutes present questions of law, which we review for 
correctness." Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14,55, 86 P.3d 
735. "When addressing such a challenge, this court presumes that the 
statute is valid, and we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of 
constitutionality." State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24,56, 980 P.2d 191. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
54 "The general rule applicable in criminal proceedings . . . is that 
by pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of 
the essential elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all 
nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional 
violations." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989); see 
also State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244,113, 54 P.3d 645. The State 
asserts that Defendant's facial challenge to the constitutionality of 
the communications fraud statute falls within the ambit of the "pre-
plea constitutional violations" mentioned in Parsons. 781 P.2d at 
1278. Therefore, the State argues that because Defendant's challenge 
is nonjurisdictional in nature, it was waived by his guilty plea. 
Defendant asserts that "pre-plea constitutional violations," id., 
encompass violations involving such things as Miranda admonitions and 
search warrants, and that a facial constitutional challenge to a 
statute is, at its heart, a jurisdictional issue. Therefore, 
Defendant argues that his challenge was not waived by his guilty 
plea. 
55 "Subject matter jurisdiction is the power and authority of the 
court to determine a controversy and without which it cannot 
proceed." Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) (per curiam). Subject matter jurisdiction "can neither be 
waived nor conferred by consent of the accused. Objection to the 
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter may be urged at any 
stage of the proceedings, and the right to make such an objection is 
never waived." James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) (quotations and citations omitted). When subject matter 
jurisdiction is an issue, "[i]t is the duty of this court to 'satisfy 
itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower 
courts in a cause under review.'" EEOC v. Chicago Club, 86 F.3d 1423, 
1428 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 
(1934) ) ,-^ -
16 "In general, a plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional 
defects, but does not bar appeal of claims that the applicable 
statute is unconstitutional or that the indictment fails to state an 
offense." United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1262 n.l (9th 
Cir. 1979). "Although a guilty plea waives all non[]jurisdictional 
defects and fact issues, a vagueness challenge is a jurisdictional 
defect. Thus, following a guilty plea, a defendant could raise on 
appeal that he was prosecuted under an unconstitutional statute." 
United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314, 1317 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(quotations and citation omitted); see Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 
61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam) ("We simply hold that a plea of guilty 
to a charge does not waive a claim that — judged on its face — the 
charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute."); 
Blackledqe v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974) (holding that guilty 
plea did not preclude the defendant from raising his constitutional 
claims because they "went to the very power of the State to bring the 
defendant into court to answer the charge brought against him"); 
United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2002) (addressing 
defendant's claim that the underlying statute was unconstitutional 
because it "properly f[e]ll within the narrow scope of review not 
barred by a guilty plea11)/ cert, denied, 538 U.S. 1065 (2003); United 
States v. Morgan, 230 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000) (recognizing 
that a claim that a statute is facially unconstitutional is a 
jurisdictional claim not waived by a guilty plea); United States v. 
McKenzie, 99 F.3d 813, 816 (7th Cir. 1996) (addressing defendant's 
argument on appeal after his guilty plea because he made "the only 
argument available to him by asserting a jurisdictional challenge 
based on the constitutionality of the underlying statute"); United 
States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 885 n.l (7th Cir. 1996) ("[The 
defendant] entered his guilty plea without preserving his 
constitutional challenge[ to the underlying statute] for appeal. 
However, the government has expressly declined to raise a waiver 
argument, citing United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495, 496-97 (7th Cir. 
1995) (challenge to constitutionality of statute of conviction is, in 
certain circumstances, jurisdictional claim not waived by guilty 
plea)."); Bell, 70 F.3d at 496-97 (addressing defendant's challenge 
to the constitutionality of the underlying statute after recognizing 
the principle that such a challenge "is a jurisdictional claim which 
is not waived by the guilty plea"); United States v. Palacios-
Casquete, 55 F.3d 557, 561 (11th Cir. 1995) ("A guilty plea . . . 
does not waive the right of an accused to challenge the 
constitutionality of the statute under which he is convicted."); 
Marzano v. Kincheloe, 915 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that 
the defendant "did not waive his constitutional attack on the 
[underlying] statute by pleading guilty"); United States v. Montilla, 
870 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that although the dividing 
line between constitutional claims that are waived by a guilty plea 
and those that survive the plea is not "crystal-clear," "[c]laims 
that 'the applicable statute is unconstitutional or that the 
indictment fails to state an offense' are jurisdictional claims not 
waived by the guilty plea" (quoting Broncheau, 597 F.2d at 1262 
n.l)), amended by 907 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Barboa, 777 F.2d 1420, 1423 n.3 (10th Cir. 1985) ("A plea of 
guilty . . . does not bar a claim that the defendant may not 
constitutionally be convicted in the first instance . . . . If [the 
defendant] ple[aded] guilty to something which was not a crime, he is 
not now precluded from raising this jurisdictional defect, which goes 
'to the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court to 
answer the charge brought against him.'" (quoting Blackledqe, 417 
U.S. at 30)); United States v. Hill, 564 F.2d 1179, 1180 (5th Cir. 
1977) (per curiam) (recognizing that "a guilty plea does not bar an 
appeal that asserts that . . . the charge is unconstitutional"); 
United States v. Tallant, 547 F.2d 1291, 1295 n.5 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(recognizing that a claim based upon "the unconstitutionality of the 
statute underlying the indictment" was an "appealable issue[] 
following a . . . guilty plea"); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 
975, 978 n.8 (5th Cir. 1975) (recognizing "that after entering . . . 
a plea of guilty, a defendant may only appeal jurisdictional defects 
in the proceeding below, such as . . . the unconstitutionality of the 
statute underlying the indictment"); Mercado v. Rockefeller, 502 F.2d 
666, 672 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[I]t is clear that [a] guilty plea waives 
only nonjurisdictional defects and does not waive the right to 
contest the constitutionality of the statute that is the basis for a 
conviction." (second alteration in original) (quotations and citation 
omitted)); United States v. Cox, 464 F.2d 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1972) 
(recognizing that "[a] defendant who has pleaded guilty is not barred 
from claiming . . . that the statute under which he was charged is 
unconstitutional" (quotations and citation omitted)); 1A Charles Alan 
Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 175 (3d ed. 1999) 
("[T]he preclusive effects of guilty pleas do not apply to 
constitutional claims that go fto the very power of the State to 
bring the defendant into court to answer the charge brought against 
him.T A defendant who has pleaded guilty may still contend . . . that 
the statute under which he was charged is unconstitutional." (quoting 
Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30) (footnotes omitted)). 
57 Because a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute 
directly cuts to "the power and authority of the court to determine a 
controversy," Thompson, 743 P.2d at 1232, it is necessarily a 
jurisdictional matter. Accordingly, an unconditional guilty plea does 
not operate as a waiver of a facial constitutional challenge to a 
statute, because such a challenge is jurisdictional in nature.-^-
Therefore, we address Defendant's arguments .-^ -
II. Constitutional Challenge 
1Q Defendant argues that the communications fraud statute is 
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
1801 (2003). We consider each of his arguments in turn. 
A. Overbreadth 
59 "In considering whether a statute [is overbroad], a court's first 
task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial 
amount of constitutionally protected conduct." In re I.M.L., 2002 UT 
110,515, 61 P.3d 1038 (quotations and citations omitted). We examine 
"criminal statutes . . . with particular care; those that make 
unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct 
may be held facially invalid even if they also have legitimate 
application." Id. (quotations and citations omitted). However, " [o] 
nly a statute that is substantially overbroad may be invalidated on 
its face." City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987). 
Overbreadth "must not only be real, but substantial as well." 
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 584 (2002) (quotations and citation 
omitted). 
110 When interpreting the challenged language, "we look to the 
statute's plain language and presume that the legislature used each 
term advisedly." In re I.M.L., 2002 UT 110 at 116. "Statutory 
language is overbroad if its language proscribes both harmful and 
innocuous behavior." Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1263 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quotations and citations omitted). The 
communications fraud statute prohibits devis[ing] any scheme or 
artifice to defraud another or to obtain from another money, 
property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, 
and . . . communicat[ing] directly or indirectly with any person by 
any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or 
artifice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). Defendant posits that the 
communications fraud statute is overbroad "because it permits 
criminal prosecution and sanctions in every case involving a 
communication[] that could be construed as dishonest." Specifically, 
Defendant argues that the communications fraud statute does not 
require an intent to defraud, and that it criminalizes innocuous 
behavior because "[a]s long as there is an artifice, a false 
communication in any form made for the purpose of executing the 
artifice, and a desire to obtain anything of value, the elements of 
the communications fraud statute are met." Defendant also alleges 
that the modes of communications prohibited in the communications 
fraud statute are similarly overbroad and prohibit constitutionally 
protected conduct. See id. § 76-10-1801(6). We disagree. 
Ill First, the communications fraud statute does not prohibit all 
false "pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions," 
only those where an individual seeks "to defraud another or to obtain 
from another money, property, or anything of value." Id. § 76-10-1801 
(1). Second, it requires proof that the false or fraudulent 
"pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions made or 
omitted were made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a 
reckless disregard for the truth." Id^ _ § 76-10-1801(7). While the 
First Amendment may value some falsehoods for their contribution to 
public debate, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 
n.19 (1964), it has not given protection to malicious statements that 
were made "with knowledge that [they were] false or with reckless 
disregard of whether [they were] false or not." Id. at 279-80. The 
communications fraud statute draws the distinction between criminal 
and innocent behavior with a similar mens rea, and thus, it cannot be 
said that it is "substantially overbroad" and should be "invalidated 
on its face." Hill, 482 U.S. at 458. Accordingly, we conclude that 
the communications fraud statute is not overbroad on its face. 
B. Vagueness 
512 Defendant argues that the communications fraud statute is 
unconstitutionally vague in its use of the terms "artifice," 
"communicate," and "anything of value." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 
(1), (6)(a). "The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a statute 
or ordinance define an offense with sufficient definiteness that 
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a 
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement." Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265 (quotations and citations 
omitted). However, because the communications fraud statute 
"implicates no constitutionally protected conduct," Defendant must 
show that it "is impermissibly vague in all of its applications." 
Village of Hoffmann Estates v. Flipside, Hoffmann Estates, Inc., 455 
U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982). 
fl3 Defendant argues that the term "artifice," Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-1801(1), is defined too broadly and would encompass any form of 
deceit so that ordinary persons would not know whether the deceit was 
prohibited. While not defined in the communications fraud statute, 
"artifice" is commonly understood to mean "an artful stratagem," or a 
"trick." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 106 (9th ed. 1986). 
Black1s Law Dictionary defines "artifice" similarly as "[a] clever 
plan or idea, especially] one intended to deceive." Black1 s Law 
Dictionary 108 (7th ed. 1999) . Additionally, we do not read the term 
"artifice," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), in a vacuum, but rather 
as it relates to the other terms within the communications fraud 
statute. See Dowlinq v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50,58, 502 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 
(stating that "[s]ubsections of a statute should not be construed in 
a vacuum but must be read as part of the statute as a 
whole" (alteration in original) (quotations and citation omitted)). 
Contrary to Defendant's assertions, the communications fraud statute 
does not prohibit all artful stratagems and tricks, only those meant 
to, inter alia, defraud others. While the term "artifice," Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), may be construed broadly, "a statute is not 
unconstitutionally vague because it is broad." State v. Wareham, 772 
P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). We conclude that the term "artifice," Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), is used with "sufficient definiteness that 
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a 
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement." Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265 (quotations and citations 
omitted). Therefore, we conclude that the term "artifice," as used in 
the communications fraud statute, is not unconstitutionally vague. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). 
SI14 Defendant next argues that the term "communicate," Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-1801(6)(a), is vague because it is "given the broadest 
possible definition" under the communications fraud statute. The 
communications fraud statute prohibits "communicat[ing] directly or 
indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of executing 
or concealing the scheme or artifice." Id. § 76-10-1801(1). 
Additionally, it specifically states that to communicate "means to 
bestow, convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of 
information; to talk over; or to transmit information." Id. § 76-10-
1801(6)(a). Defendant's argument is unavailing. Although 
"communicate," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(6) (a) , is broadly defined, 
this does not necessarily make the term unconstitutionally vague. See 
Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966. Indeed, the communications fraud statute 
does not seek to punish those who keep an artifice or scheme to 
themselves. Defendant fails to demonstrate how "ordinary people can 
[not] understand what conduct is prohibited," Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265 
(quotations and citations omitted), and therefore, fails to 
demonstrate that the term "communicate," as used in the 
communications fraud statute, is unconstitutionally vague. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-1801(6) (a). 
515 Finally, Defendant argues that the phrase "anything of value," 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), is unconstitutionally vague because 
it is undefined and left open to a variety of interpretations. 
Defendant proffers numerous hypothetical situations in an attempt to 
illustrate the vagueness of the phrase "anything of value." Id. 
However, "speculation about possible vagueness in hypothetical 
situations not before the [c]ourt will not support a facial attack on 
a statute when it is surely valid in the vast majority of its 
intended applications." Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 733 (2000) 
(quotations and citation omitted). Defendant was charged under the 
communications fraud statute because he devised a scheme to defraud 
others of "money." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). We believe that 
"the vast majority of [the communications fraud statute's] intended 
applications," Colorado, 530 U.S. at 733 (quotations and citations 
omitted), will involve incidents where individuals have defrauded 
others of "money" or "property," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), both 
of which are terms that are sufficiently understood to allow ordinary 
citizens to determine what conduct is prohibited. See Lopez, 935 P.2d 
at 1265. Additionally, because Defendant was charged with devising a 
scheme to defraud others of "money," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), 
his actions do not fall within the "anything of value" realm, id., 
and thus, he may not challenge this phrase as unconstitutionally 
vague. See Village of Hoffmann Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n.7 ("One to 
whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully 
challenge it for vagueness." (quotations and citation omitted) ) .-^ -
516 Defendant's constitutional challenge to the communications fraud 
statute fails. We conclude that the communications fraud statute is 
neither unconstitutionally overbroad, nor unconstitutionally vague. 
CONCLUSION 
517 A facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is 
jurisdictional in nature and, therefore, we conclude that Defendant's 
facial challenge to the constitutionality of the communications fraud 
statute is not barred by his voluntary, unconditional guilty plea. 
However, in considering Defendant's facial challenge to the 
communications fraud statute on overbreadth and vagueness grounds, we 
conclude that it is not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. 
Accordingly, we affirm Defendant's conviction. 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
ORME, Judge (concurring) : 
518 I concur in the court's opinion. I write separately to explain my 
position, because I recognize the lead opinion represents a departure 
from the general prohibition against raising issues for the first 
time on appeal, especially in the face of a guilty plea. 
519 For me, the easy proposition is this: Subject matter jurisdiction 
is an issue that may be raised by either party or the court at any 
time. So far as I am aware, there is no exception to this rule for 
guilty pleas. See James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) ("[Subject matter jurisdiction] is derived from the law. It can 
neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the accused. Objection 
to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter may be urged 
at any stage of the proceedings, and the right to make such an 
objection is never waived.") (internal quotations & citation 
omitted), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). 
220 In this sense, the lead opinion's analogy to sovereign immunity 
cases is actually pretty good. If a plaintiff sued the State without 
giving the required presuit notice, and the State did not raise the 
lack of notice as a defense below, it would presumably not be 
permitted to raise the lack of notice for the first time on appeal in 
challenging a judgment that had been entered against it. However, if 
giving the presuit notice is necessary to vest the court with subject 
matter jurisdiction, then of course the lack of notice could be 
raised for the first time on appeal. And indeed, giving presuit 
notice strictly in compliance with the sovereign immunity statute has 
been held to be a matter of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., 
Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109,516, 37 P.3d 1156. 
521 While this kind of subject matter jurisdiction issue usually 
arises in civil cases, the concept is the same in criminal cases. If 
a guilty plea is entered, and no issues are reserved for appeal 
consistent with State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), then unless the guilty plea is set aside as involuntary, all 
issues are waived on appeal, except subject matter jurisdiction, 
which can never be waived. See James, 965 P.2d at 570. Thus, if a 32-
year-old defendant was charged with murder in juvenile court and pled 
guilty, on appeal to this court he most certainly could challenge the 
lack of the juvenile court!s subject matter jurisdiction over an 
adult charged with murder, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-104, -105 
(Supp. 2003)--even if the guilty plea was otherwise proper and he 
never raised the jurisdictional problem below. The same is true if a 
defendant pled guilty to the "crime" of blasphemy, and no such 
criminal offense were on the books in Utah. If he pled guilty, and 
did not raise below the point that no such crime existed in Utah, he 
still could challenge his conviction by raising, albeit for the first 
time on appeal, the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. And 
obviously he would succeed. The trial court simply would lack the 
judicial power to convict the defendant of a nonexistent crime. 
122 Here is where it gets admittedly more tricky: Suppose our 
criminal code made it a felony to commit the crime of blasphemy, 
defined as "disparaging the one Almighty God or questioning His 
existence." If a defendant pled guilty to that offense, did not 
preserve a constitutional challenge for appeal under Sery, and did 
not raise the constitutionality issue below, could he raise for the 
first time on appeal the facial unconstitutionality, under the First 
Amendment, of the statute criminalizing blasphemy? At one level, it 
seems that charges brought pursuant to such a statute would be just 
as much a nullity as charges brought, as in the immediately preceding 
hypothetical, in the complete absence of any blasphemy statute. In 
simplest terms, in this country there simply could be no crime of 
blasphemy--any statute purporting to provide otherwise would be 
facially unconstitutional. But he could not raise this constitutional 
challenge for the first time on appeal unless facial 
unconstitutionality goes to subject matter jurisdiction.-^- Does it? I 
am not completely sure, although [ can see that, in concept, an 
unconstitutional statute is as ineffectual as no statute. 
123 This is what ultimately explains my vote in this case: No Utah 
appellate court has squarely answered the question of whether a 
challenge to a criminal statute based on facial unconstitutionality 
goes to subject matter jurisdiction. The lead opinion cites a 
multitude of cases that have held it does; Judge Bench's opinion 
cites no case that has addressed the question and held it does not.-^-
It is admittedly somewhat counterintuitive for me that a substantive 
conclusion of unconstitutionality--even facial unconstitutionality— 
defeats subject matter jurisdiction, but that seems to be the 
prevailing view. Accordingly, with some trepidation, I concur in the 
court's opinion. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
BENCH, Judge (concurring in the result): 
124 I do not necessarily disagree with the main opinion's analysis of 
the constitutionality of the communications fraud statute. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (2003) . But, because of the procedural posture 
of this case, I would rule that we cannot reach the issue under 
controlling Utah law.-^-
525 As recognized by the main opinion, Defendant entered an 
unconditional guilty plea to three counts of communications fraud. 
Cf. State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (allowing 
defendants to enter conditional pleas preserving the right to appeal 
any specified pretrial ruling). In the district court, Defendant 
never challenged the constitutionality of the statute. Nor did he 
enter a conditional plea to preserve his right to appeal the 
constitutionality of the communications fraud statute. See id. 
Furthermore, Defendant never filed a motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea. S^e State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,53, 40 P.3d 630 (requiring 
defendant to file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea within thirty 
days after the entry of the plea before defendant can challenge the 
validity of the guilty plea on appeal). Instead, Defendant filed a 
notice of appeal directly from his sentence. Now, for the first time, 
Defendant attempts to raise the issues of overbreadth and vagueness 
as constitutional challenges to the communications fraud statute. He 
claims he can do so because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be 
waived and that the district court lacked jurisdiction to convict him 
of violating an unconstitutional statute. 
126 This approach reflects a basic misunderstanding of jurisdiction. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently explained subject matter jurisdiction 
very succinctly as follows: "A court has subject matter jurisdiction 
if the case is one of the type of cases the court has been empowered 
to entertain by the constitution or statute from which the court 
derives its authority." Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31,516, 498 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 4 (other quotations and citation omitted); see also Salt Lake 
City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 852 (Utah 1994) ("Subject matter 
jurisdiction is ?the authority and competency of the court to decide 
the case.1" (citations omitted)). 
527 The main opinion contends that a facial challenge to the 
constitutionality of a statute is necessarily a jurisdictional matter 
because the inherent constitutionality of a statute affects whether a 
court has the power and authority to decide the issue. However, 
without a proper challenge, courts must presume the constitutionality 
of a statute. 
Statutes are presumed to be constitutional until the contrary is 
clearly shown. It is only when statutes manifestly infringe upon some 
constitutional provision that they can be declared void. Every 
reasonable presumption must be indulged in and every reasonable doubt 
resolved in favor of constitutionality. 
Jones v. Board of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53,510, P.3d 
(quotations and citations omitted). Thus, because the communications 
fraud statute was not challenged below, it is presumed to be 
constitutional, and the district court had jurisdiction. 
128 In footnote two of the main opinion, my colleagues attempt to 
find support for their extraordinary decision by pointing to the 
distinction between general jurisdiction and subject matter 
jurisdiction. As noted by the main opinion, we do not focus "on 
whether subject matter jurisdiction exists in [this] particular 
context" because, unlike claims made against governmental entities--
which require compliance with the Immunity Act—the communications 
fraud statute at issue here requires that nothing be done, by either 
party, before criminal defendants can be prosecuted and courts can 
exercise subject matter jurisdiction. With claims against a 
governmental entity, "the legislature has explicitly declared how, 
what, when, and to whom a party must direct and deliver a Notice in 
order to preserve his or her right to maintain an action against a 
governmental entity." Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109,115, 
37 P.3d 1156. Thus, "[c]ompliance with the Immunity Act is necessary 
to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a trial court to hear 
claims against governmental entities." Id. at 516. In the instant 
case, as with presumably every other criminal prosecution, the 
charging statute does not explicitly declare what must be done before 
subject matter jurisdiction is conferred. Thus, the district court 
had general jurisdiction as well as subject matter jurisdiction due 
to an absence of legislative requirements or limitations .-^ -
129 Therefore, if Defendant wanted to challenge the constitutionality 
of the communications fraud statute, he had to do so first in the 
district court. See, e.g., State v. Puqmire, 898 P.2d 271, 272 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995) ("Although [defendant] raises the issue on appeal, he 
did not challenge the constitutionality of this statutory scheme 
before the trial court. As a general rule, we will not consider 
issues — including constitutional issues — initially raised on 
appeal."); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("As 
the Utah appellate courts have reiterated many times, we generally 
will not consider an issue, even a constitutional one, which the 
appellant raises on appeal for the first time."). 
130 This rule applies with equal force to facial challenges to a 
statute made for the first time on appeal. In State v. Archambeau, 
820 P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), when a facial challenge to a 
criminal statute was raised for the first time on appeal, this court 
addressed Archambeaufs challenge only for the "plain error" and 
"exceptional circumstances" arguments he made. See Archambeau, 820 
P.2d at 922, 926. Defendant, in the instant appeal, asserts no claim 
of plain error or exceptional circumstances. 
131 Allowing defendants to raise constitutional challenges for the 
first time on appeal will logically necessitate overruling a large 
body of jurisdictional jurisprudence involving Utahfs justice courts. 
See, e.g., City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 517 (Utah 
1990) ("[T]his Court [has] repeatedly held that a person dissatisfied 
with a justice court decision could appeal that decision to a 
district court and that the district court decision was final unless 
the validity or constitutionality of a statute was at issue, not on 
appeal, but in the lower court."); Draper City v. Roper, 2003 UT App 
312,12, 78 P.3d 631 (per curiam) ("fThe decision of the district 
court [from a hearing de novo following a justice court's ruling] is 
final and may not be appealed unless the district court rules on the 
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance.'" (quoting Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-5-120(7))); South Salt Lake City v. Terkelson, 2002 UT App 
405,16, 61 P.3d 282 ("Utah case law clearly provides that neither 
this court nor the Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear an 
appeal from proceedings in the district court held pursuant to an 
appeal from the justice court unless the issues raised in the justice 
court involve[] the validity or constitutionality of an ordinance or 
statute." (quotations and citations omitted)); City of Kanab v. 
Guskey, 965 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("[H]istorically, 
Utah appellate courts have never had jurisdiction to hear appeals of 
district court decisions after a de novo trial on appeal from an 
unfavorable justice court judgment, absent the raising of a 
constitutional challenge in the justice court."). The practical 
consequence of the main opinion is that defendants will now be 
allowed to challenge the constitutionality of a statute in this 
court, for the first time, without ever having bothered to raise the 
issue in either justice or district court. 
132 Having failed below to challenge the statute on grounds of 
overbreadth and vagueness, and having failed on appeal to argue 
either plain error or exceptional circumstances, Defendant is now 
precluded from challenging the constitutionality of the 
communications fraud statute. I would therefore affirm based on 
Defendant's failure to preserve his constitutional challenge. 
Russell W. Bench, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
1. Because the communications fraud statute has not changed since 
Defendant was charged, we cite to the most current version for 
convenience. 
2. Instead of focusing on whether subject matter jurisdiction exists 
in a particular context, Judge Bench relies on Utah cases generally 
describing jurisdiction of our courts of general jurisdiction. The 
issue squarely presented in this case has not been addressed by Utah 
courts. 
Our jurisprudence, however, is no stranger to the concept that a 
court with general jurisdiction over a particular claim may or may 
not have subject matter jurisdiction over that claim. Although not 
directly analogous to the case at bar, perhaps the best example 
involves claims against governmental entities. There is no question 
that courts of general jurisdiction in Utah have jurisdiction over 
those claims. This notwithstanding, however, Utah appellate decisions 
have repeatedly held that the failure to strictly comply with the 
statutory requirements for claims against governmental entities 
deprives those courts of subject matter jurisdiction over such 
claims. See, e.g., Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109,2516-17, 
37 P.3d 1156; Security Inv. Ltd. v. Brown, 2002 UT App 131,113, 47 
P.3d 97. 
3. The justice court appeal process analog in Judge Bench!s opinion 
is somewhat puzzling. 
Since justice courts are not courts of record, traditional appellate 
review is generally unavailable or severely limited. This 
notwithstanding, the Utah Constitution guarantees "the right to 
appeal in all[ criminal] cases." Utah Const, art. I, § 12. In City of 
Monticello v, Christensen, 788 P.2d 513 (Utah 1990), our supreme 
court ruled that the trial de novo appellate procedure now set out in 
Utah Code Annotated section 78-5-120 (2002) satisfied this 
constitutional mandate. See Christensen, 788 P.2d at 518-19. 
Following a trial de novo, traditional appeal therefrom is available 
only if "the district court rules on the constitutionality of a 
statute or ordinance." Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(7). 
In our view, this unique process for obtaining review of justice 
court proceedings has nothing to do with issue preservation or waiver 
of nonjurisdictional constitutional claims by voluntary guilty plea— 
section 78-5-120 makes no reference to either. Indeed, if anything, 
it is a recognition of the importance of claims involving the 
constitutionality of statutes or ordinances, specifically 
contemplating such challenges in the court of record in the first 
appeal. Under the statutory scheme, raising the constitutional 
challenge to the statute or ordinance is the method by which 
jurisdiction is conferred on appellate courts to entertain further 
appeals, the defendant having already been accorded his or her 
constitutional right of appeal from the justice court by trial de 
novo in a court of record. This is a far cry from the ability to 
challenge subject matter jurisdiction in an initial appeal of right. 
4. The State argues that Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, 498 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 4, both addresses and disposes of the issues herein. The 
appellant's claims in Myers were based upon the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act, see id. at 510; and, to the extent the appellant 
alluded to constitutional defects in a statute, his challenge was not 
facial. Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court characterized his 
argument as based on an "allegedly incorrect legal interpretation [of 
a rule of law]," and never addressed or ruled upon the effect of a 
facial constitutional challenge. Id. at 117. 
5. In his brief on appeal, Defendant states that "[a]rguably, this is 
precisely the type of conduct the communications fraud statute was 
intended to prohibit." 
6. Judge Bench points out such an argument could be reached under the 
plain error doctrine. Maybe. But the rescue opportunity provided by 
the plain error doctrine is rather limited. As hereafter shown, the 
ability to claim plain error can itself be waived. In contrast, 
subject matter jurisdiction can never be waived. In the blasphemy 
hypothetical, if facial unconstitutionality is a matter of subject 
matter jurisdiction, it could be addressed for the first time on 
appeal even if plain error was not raised, see State v. All Real 
Property, 2004 UT App 232,113 n.7; was inadequately raised, see State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993) (holding that if any of 
the requirements for plain error are not met, "plain error is not 
established" and cannot be raised); or was raised too late. See 
Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98,19, 17 P.3d 1122 (holding court would 
not reach unpreserved issues under plain error doctrine because plain 
error raised for first time in reply brief). 
7. I disagree with Judge Bench's claim that Myers v. State, 2004 UT 
31, 498 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, considered this question and rejected it on 
the merits. The Myers court described the jurisdictional argument 
asserted in the case as being "somewhat convoluted." Id. at 115. 
Later, the Court characterized the argument as being tantamount to a 
"claim[] that the trial court's decision constituted an 'erroneous 
application of the law.1" Id. at 117 (citation omitted). In any 
event, the Court's dismissal of the jurisdictional argument in Myers 
was premised on the simplistic notion that "f[a] court has subject 
matter jurisdiction if the case is one of the type of cases the court 
has been empowered to entertain by the constitution or statute from 
which the court derives its authority,'" id. at 116 (citation 
omitted)—an obvious overstatement as readily shown by the sovereign 
immunity example, i.e., district courts have general civil 
jurisdiction and even jurisdiction over disputes against the State, 
but lack subject matter jurisdiction over such a case if the presuit 
notice is flawed in some way. Another example of the overbreadth of 
the pronouncement in Myers is the fact that appellate courts have the 
constitutional and statutory power to consider appeals, and yet are 
held to lack subject matter jurisdiction over appeals that are 
untimely. See Utah Const, art. VIII § 3 ("The Supreme Court shall 
have appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as 
provided by statute . . . . " ) ; id. § 5 ("The jurisdiction of all 
other courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided by 
statute."); Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (2002) (specifying Supreme 
Court's appellate jurisdiction); id. § 78-2a-3(2) (specifying 
appellate jurisdiction of Court of Appeals); Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. 
Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 571 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("[F]ailure to file 
an appeal within the required time limit deprived the court of 
subject matter jurisdiction.") (citing Watson v. Anderson, 29 Utah 2d 
36, 504 P.2d 1003, 1004 (1973)). 
The very best indication that the Myers court simply did not have 
before it the issue we must decide--at least not in any kind of 
cogent, well-developed way—is that the only authority cited in Myers 
is two decisions from the Utah Court of Appeals and the statute 
giving the district courts original jurisdiction of "all matters 
civil and criminal," subject to certain limitations. Myers, 2003 UT 
31 at 516 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (2002)). The Myers 
opinion did not acknowledge, much less did it treat, the extensive 
state and federal jurisprudence categorizing the facial 
unconstitutionality of a criminal statute as being a matter^of_ 
subject matter jurisdiction—a virtual impossibility if the argument 
had actually been made and was well-supported, as in the instant 
case. 
8. Given the clarity of the Utah Law, decisions from the federal 
courts are not helpful. Nor are the federal cases even consistent 
with each other. See, e.g., United States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549, 
552 (9th Cir. 1989) amended by 907 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The 
dividing line between the majority of constitutional claims waived by 
a voluntary plea of guilty, and those that challenge the right of the 
state to hale the defendant into court, and thus survive the plea . . 
. , has not been crystal-clear."). 
9. In an attempt to bolster the main opinion's reasoning, the 
concurring opinion discusses some rather bizarre hypotheticals. 
First, the thirty-two-year-old defendant charged with murder in 
juvenile court. Thankfully, this potential calamity has already been 
resolved by our legislature. See. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-104, -105(1) 
(a) (2002) (detailing jurisdiction of juvenile courts). By contrast, 
our legislature has not limited the jurisdiction of district courts 
in a similar manner. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (2002) ("The 
district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by 
law."). Second, the criminal defendant who pleads guilty to the 
nonexistent crime of blasphemy. If no such crime of blasphemy 
existed, then we would not indulge in the presumption that a 
nonexistent, unwritten statute was constitutional. Here, however, a 
statute does exist, and, until challenged, we must presume it to be 
constitutional. Third, if a defendant pleaded guilty to the 
theoretical crime of blasphemy, and did not preserve his 
constitutional challenge, then he could raise the challenge for the 
first time on appeal by arguing plain error. A plain error challenge 
could easily be made without making the facial constitutionality of a 
statute a prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction. 
As for the concurring opinion's statement that ff[n]o Utah appellate 
court has squarely answered the question of whether a challenge based 
on facial unconstitutionality goes to subject matter jurisdiction," 
our supreme court has squarely addressed the question. In Myers v. 
State, 2004 UT 31, 498 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, the Utah Supreme Court 
explained that even when Myers argued, for the first time on appeal, 
that the wholly and facially unconstitutional aggravated murder 
statute divested the trial court of jurisdiction, he had "failed to 
state any legitimate jurisdictional defect" because "[t]he Utah Code 
provides that fthe district court has original jurisdiction in all 
matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and 
not prohibited by law.1" Id_^  at 1116 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 
(1)). The instant case is no different. Thus, even when Norris 
argues, for the first time on appeal, that the communications fraud 
statute is facially unconstitutional, and that such 
unconstitutionality goes to the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
district court, he fails "to state any legitimate jurisdictional 
defect." Myers, 2004 UT 31 at 116. 
